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Theory and methods
The´orie et me´thodes
Albert Doja
The shoulders of our giants:
Claude Levi-Strauss and his legacy in current´
anthropology
Abstract. In the course of anti-structuralist criticism, the main thrust of Le´vi-
Strauss’s epistemological approach seems to have been lost, to the collective detriment of
social sciences and anthropology. By its monumental character, Le´vi-Strauss’s work
evokes that of the founders of anthropology, whereas, by the way in which it puts in
relation the cultural and the mental, it anticipates a theoretical anthropology to come,
with the ambition of providing a rigorous method that comes close to scientific
knowledge. The fundamental point remains the emancipation of the structural
approach from the linguistic model and its orientation toward a new context of science
and technology, as exemplified in mathematics, information science, cybernetics and
game theory, which made it possible for structural anthropology to innovatively
account for the social systems and praxis of competitive and strategic practices.
Key words. Anthropological theory – Claude Le´vi-Strauss – History of anthropology
Re´sume´. Au cours du criticisme anti-structuraliste, l’objectif central de l’approche
e´piste´mologique de Le´vi-Strauss semble avoir e´te´ perdue au de´triment collectif de
l’anthropologie et des sciences sociales. Par son caracte`re monumental, l’œuvre de
Le´vi-Strauss e´voque celle des fondateurs de l’anthropologie, alors que par la fac¸on
dont elle met en rapport le culturel et le mental, elle anticipe sur une anthropologie
the´orique a` venir, avec l’ambition de fournir une me´thode rigoureuse d’investigation
anthropologique proche du savoir scientifique. Le point fondamental reste
l’e´mancipation de l’approche structurale hors du mode`le linguistique, vers un
nouveau contexte scientifique et technologique illustre´ en mathe´matiques, sciences de
l’information, cyberne´tique et the´orie des jeux, qui permet a` l’anthropologie structurale
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de rendre compte de fac¸on innovatrice des syste`mes sociaux comme de la praxis des
pratiques compe´titives et strate´giques.
Mots-cle´s. Claude Le´vi-Strauss – Histoire de l’anthropologie – The´orie de l’anthropologie
If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.
(Isaac Newton, 1676)
Introduction
It is sometimes claimed that A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw
Malinowski more or less single-handedly created modern anthro-
pology. This may have seemed to be the case in the mid-20th century,
when Boasian American anthropology had diverged into many
specialized strands and Marcel Mauss’s students had not yet made
their mark in French anthropology. British kinship studies seemed,
in contrast, to rest securely on a method invented by Malinowski
and a theory developed by Radcliffe-Brown, as an established
‘‘science of society’’. Major changes took place in anthropology
during the 1950s and 1960s, economics and politics were re-
conceptualized, and new theories of symbolic meaning transformed
the discipline. As Eriksen and Nielsen (2001: 95) put it, develop-
ments in North America and Britain differed, although the problems
raised were similar; yet the single most important theorist was
French.
If, already in the ﬁrst post-war years, Claude Le´vi-Strauss emerged
as an exemplary thinker, as the most important ﬁgure in the history
of anthropology and as the ‘‘ecumenical’’, ‘‘paradigmatic anthropol-
ogist’’ (Diamond, 1974) of the second half of the 20th century, this
implies a good deal about the intellectual milieu of our time and of
anthropology in particular. In the 1950s and 1960s, for a number of
reasons, not the least of which was Le´vi-Strauss’s astute promotion
of his discipline (Johnson, 2003: 29), anthropology became one of
the essential references of French intellectual discourse, adopting
part of the mainstream of ideas deﬁned as structuralism, which
had the ambition of providing social sciences with a rigour and
power comparable to those of the natural sciences.
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In a ﬁrst essay on the ‘‘advent of heroic anthropology in the
history of ideas’’ (Doja, 2005), I showed that, while Le´vi-Strauss’s
structural anthropology was a reaction against the predominantly
phenomenological bias of French philosophy in the post-war years
as well as against the old humanism of existentialism, which
seemed parochial both in its conﬁnement to a speciﬁc tradition of
western philosophy and in its lack of interest in scientiﬁc approach,
the paradigm of structural anthropology cannot be equated with the
ﬁeld of structuralism, which became a very contestable form of intel-
lectual fashion. Structural methodology played an essential role in
the development of Le´vi-Strauss’s ideas, and it is impossible to over-
estimate the contribution of linguistics to structural anthropology.
The basic principles are relatively simple, and can be illustrated by
examples taken from any language: the unconscious nature of the
rules underlying linguistic utterances, the arbitrariness of the sign,
and the differential and combinatorial basis of meaning. These
points constitute the vulgate of structuralism as it was disseminated
in the 1950s and 1960s, and even as it is still taught today.
In this article I want to show that for Le´vi-Strauss structuralism
was only the narrow framework of a brilliant venture. Essentially,
his work is at once more modest, more scrupulous and much more
relevant for anthropological knowledge, even if the style remains
a baroque mixture of equilibrium and witty liveliness. Although
structuralism may once have had a beneﬁcial role, it has become
an obstacle to the full development of ideas for which anthropology
is after all indebted to Le´vi-Strauss. His approach came less from
general principles than from a demanding and audacious intellectual
attitude. Thanks to this attitude and a number of deep intuitions,
theoretical work offered him the appealing opportunity to look
for order within chaos and to make a very general and at the same
time very personal contribution to anthropology.
Structural models
Le´vi-Strauss is a systematic thinker, a constructor establishing in
sequence, step by step, the different conceptual building-blocks
that were to make up the ediﬁce of structural theory in anthro-
pology. In itself, the heuristic closure of Le´vi-Strauss’s procedures
seems unexceptionable and could be taken to be a necessary part
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of any process of demonstration aspiring to any degree of rigour.
This makes some to believe that in Le´vi-Strauss’s work the hypo-
theses he advances are closed and self-validating to the extent that,
through their own forward momentum, they have become increas-
ingly independent of any external instance of validation (Johnson,
2003: 186). The structural unconscious called upon by Le´vi-Strauss
to avoid the pitfall of subjectivism did not seem to have been a great
help for some critics, who have taken it as a simple ‘‘construct’’ of a
theoretical ﬁction (Steinmetz, 1984). In fact, whereas his hypotheses
seem to function as a kind of rhetorical stepping-stone, permitting
him to proceed to the next stage of his demonstration in what seems
to be essentially a one-way process, Le´vi-Strauss never ceased basing
his approach not only on the fertility of his own intuitions but also
on the obvious relevance of the results obtained, making use of his
method more as a very ﬂexible guide for his investigations than as
a mechanical recipe that would be an end in itself.
The result is that the body of Le´vi-Strauss’s thought has grown
through the analysis of a number of thematic concepts (kinship
structures, totemism, myths) and a process of accretion and accumu-
lation of a number of implicitly accepted positions related to operat-
ing concepts such as the deep-level determination of the principle of
reciprocity, the combinatorial and oppositional nature of human
cognition, and the essentially homeostatic function of social institu-
tions and representations. The operating concepts, evident in their
context of use but difﬁcult to understand in their own right, typically
constitute a source of questions and debates among commentators
and critics.
As Le´vi-Strauss believed that linguistics was the only discipline
in the social sciences and humanities to have achieved a level of
analytical consistency comparable to that of the natural sciences,
his ambition was to introduce a similar degree of rigour into the dis-
cipline of anthropology. But this is a fact of historical relevance
rather than theoretical nature. From a theoretical point of view,
to concentrate exclusively on this inﬂuence leads to a rather one-
dimensional picture of Le´vi-Strauss’s thinking, especially of how he
came to conceptualize myth. To begin with, when he stated in his
essay ‘‘Language and the Analysis of Social Laws’’ that the results
of his analysis ‘‘can be achieved only by treatingmarriage regulations
and kinship systems as a kind of language’’ (1958d [1951]: 69 [61]),1
it was not altogether clear that this represented nothing more than
a simple analogy.
82 Social Science Information Vol 45 – no 1
Certainly, in the formulation of the paradigm of matrimonial
exchange, the linguistic model played an undeniable role. On the
methodological level, the main project, the isolation of a small
number of elementary invariant structures from which the diversity
of observable kinship structures might be derived, is directly inspired
by the work of Roman Jakobson and Nicolai Trubetzkoy in phon-
ology. On the conceptual level, the notion of the unconscious opera-
tion of social norms is construed by analogy with the implicit rules of
language. The analogy had already been well established in anthro-
pology since Franz Boas at least, to whom Le´vi-Strauss refers, but
he clearly also has in mind more contemporary developments in
linguistics (Le´vi-Strauss, 1967 [1949]: 126–7 [108–9]). Further, the
linguistic model is not mentioned in the conception of agent and
object of exchange as arbitrary and differential signs, but the argu-
ment that women are as much signs as values and the differential
variation of marked/non-marked between givers and takers are
both clearly based on the linguistic concept of binary opposition.
Finally, the idea of culture-speciﬁc socialization of individuals as
the regressive selection and combination of universal traits is
compared with the process of language acquisition.
Yet, although inspired by structural phonology, Le´vi-Strauss pro-
posed a completely new method to explain the mechanisms of sym-
bolic and social systems. Essentially, it is the model of exchange,
Marcel Mauss’s Gift (1950) to Le´vi-Strauss, as Harris (1968: 484)
punningly put it, which is seen to be more important to the theore-
tical infrastructure of The Elementary Structures. Giving to others,
an act that necessarily generates a debt, has the effect of creating
social relationships by making it possible to renew and perpetuate
them; it is an act on which the very functioning of the social order
is based. Exchange is the mechanism underlying different rules of
marriage exogamy: this is the positive aspect of the incest prohibi-
tion, seen as the primary and archetypal agent of social cohesion,
representing the passage from ‘‘nature’’ to ‘‘culture’’, from the indif-
ferent biological relation of individuals to their social relation. With-
out this properly dialectical sublation of the natural within the
social, society could not exist. Once men are forbidden to enjoy
their own women but must exchange them for others, they are
forced to set up a system of exchanges, which provides the basis for
the organization of society.
In this sense, J.P.B. Josselin de Jong (1952: 58) was correct in
asserting that the methodological principles of The Elementary
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Structures of Kinship are clear without reference to linguistics, while
Dan Sperber (1982: 94) argues that the assimilation of kinship sys-
tems to language must be understood rather as a complex metaphor
grounded on, at the very least, a kind of dubious synecdoche. This
metaphorical relation between kinship and language is probably
accompanied by a procedure of a metonymical order, but Le´vi-
Strauss never regarded himself ‘‘as bound by grammarians’ reﬁne-
ments’’ (cf. 1962b: 271–2 [205]).
The linguistic model, normally considered to be the essential com-
ponent of structural anthropology, is met by the exchange model
only in response to the question of the origin of universal mental
structures such as reciprocity, in Le´vi-Strauss’s subsequent general-
ization of the principle of reciprocity under the heading of commu-
nication. Although Le´vi-Strauss mentions Jakobson’s ‘‘inspiration’’
in the preface of the book, the linguistic model is only fully acknowl-
edged in the ﬁnal chapter, where he attempts to bring together the
different components of his theory into a coherent statement of
method, which provides the underlying rationale for the whole
work.
The language analogy must be interpreted ultimately as a method-
ological hypothesis. Basically, as Johnson (2003: 59–60) summarizes
it, there are two models which form the conceptual backbone of The
Elementary Structures. The ﬁrst and most important, Mauss’s model
of exchange, comes from within sociology; it is a ready-made
construct that Le´vi-Strauss adopts and adapts. The second model
is extraneous to sociology proper, though it does come from lin-
guistics, which Le´vi-Strauss has perhaps rather tendentiously desig-
nated as another social science. So whereas the Maussian model of
exchange might be qualiﬁed as a ‘‘ﬁrst-order’’ model, since it is
derived from the observation and comparison of diverse social phe-
nomena, the linguistic-phonological model would be a ‘‘second-
order’’ model in so far as its primary object is not the social but a
subset of the social, albeit a signiﬁcant subset.
Yet, while Le´vi-Strauss’s application of the ﬁrst model is restricted
to a single, basic function of social systems – reciprocity and
exchange – the second, in addition to the methodological inspiration
it provides, is applied to different levels of those systems – uncon-
scious norms, exchange between formally differentiated partners,
psychological development and culture-speciﬁc socialization. In
effect, what is a superposition of two models is presented by Le´vi-
Strauss as a fundamental identity. Instead of keeping the two
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domains separate, Le´vi-Strauss is intent on combining them into a
uniﬁed theory of social communication in order to obtain from
language a ‘‘logical model’’ with which to study the communicative
features of social life. In suggesting this interpretation, he was not
saying that culture derives from language or that language and
culture can be substituted for or reduced to each other, nor was
he trying to correlate language and behaviour. For Le´vi-Strauss,
there are two parallel ways of categorizing the same data of both
linguistic and social structure into homogenous and formalized
expressions of constituent units organized into a single system.
Language can be said to be a condition of culture because the material out of
which language is built is of the same type as the material out of which the
whole culture is built: logical relations, oppositions, correlations, and the like.
Language, from this point of view, may appear as laying a kind of foundation
for the more complex structures which correspond to the different aspects of
culture. (Le´vi-Strauss, 1958e [1953]: 78–9 [68–9])
Placed before the impossibility of solving the question of the
priority relationship between these two symbolic systems, Le´vi-
Strauss quite simply made this interrogation irrelevant by showing
that it is useless wanting to establish any precedence whatsoever
between the institution of marriage and verbal language. Their rela-
tionship is not causal, one is neither previous to, nor the origin or
the occasion of, the other. The necessary methodological afﬁnity is
possible precisely because, according to Le´vi-Strauss, the ‘‘reality’’
treated in both cases is not as different as one might expect, in
that both ‘‘language and exogamy share the same fundamental func-
tion of communication and social integration’’ (1967 [1949]: 565
[493]). Their relation is metaphorical, in the sense that both have an
identical operating mode, ‘‘a similar architecture’’ that is the mark
of the same energy or fundamental dynamics, which is that of the
mind at its unconscious level. The implicit line of reasoning, as John-
son (2003: 57–8) pointed out, appears to be that the ultimate basis of
the principle of reciprocity resides somewhere in the deep structure
of the human mind, and that language, the essential medium of
social intercourse, is equally the product of deep-level determina-
tion. Therefore, by virtue of their coexistence or continuity at the
level of deep structure, it is logical and valid to assume the identity
of the two from the more general perspective of communication.
For Le´vi-Strauss it is important to elucidate the problem of the
signifying system whose production must have caused, simul-
taneously, that of society. Thus the linguistic model, more than
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being simply a model applicable to certain social phenomena, is a
necessary model in that its primary object (language) shares the
same mental continuum as its secondary object (social relations).
Le´vi-Strauss explicitly formulates this idea of a continuity of func-
tions in his article ‘‘Linguistics and Anthropology’’ (1958e [1953]),
in which he views language and culture in co-evolution as two
parallel modalities of a more fundamental activity of the human
mind, which must make them formally and functionally analogous.
In the context of the development of Le´vi-Strauss’s thought
between the late 1940s and the early 1950s, his attempt at grafting
the linguistic-communicational model onto the model of exchange,
combined with his preoccupation with the psychological dimension
of reciprocity, allowed him to argue for the symbolic nature of social
institutions. The collective constructs which mediate relationships
between the different members of a community are symbolic to
the extent that their construction is a matter of arbitrary convention
and that they together form a system in many ways independent of
the lower levels of social infrastructure. If one accepts this deﬁnition
of society, then it follows that the same methods of analysis devel-
oped in structural linguistics are applicable to different aspects of
social life. According to the conception defended by Le´vi-Strauss
from the start in his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss
(1950), all social productions are symbolic systems. In this sense,
structural analysis is an intellectual tool and a scientiﬁc method
that enabled Le´vi-Strauss to pass in the 1960s, without signiﬁcant
interruption, to his second area of specialization. However, within
the broader area of the anthropology of social classiﬁcations and
symbolism, Le´vi-Strauss’s conception of myth came to owe almost
nothing to the phonological model of language.
From the start, with the inaugural text on the ‘‘Structural Study of
Myth’’ (1958g [1955]) or the ‘‘Gest of Asdiwal’’ (1973a [1959]), Le´vi-
Strauss subjected myths to the same structural analysis of which
he imported the model from linguistics, and more precisely from
phonology, and which he brilliantly applied to the study of kinship
systems. Yet his interpretation of the nature and function of myth
cannot be understood with reference to the linguistic model alone.
If we move from the question of the nature of myth to that of its
function, then again the linguistic model can give only a limited
and partial response. To say that the myth is a kind of second-
order language, as Roland Barthes (1993 [1957]) argued, may
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suggest how one might approach its analysis, but it does not tell us
what the myth is for. Moreover, the logic of the group of transfor-
mations and their mediating function, which has been represented
by what Le´vi-Strauss refers to as a ‘‘canonical expression’’ that
articulates a dynamic homology between meaningful elements and
allows apprehending the dynamism of structure through its transfor-
mations, is linguistically indefensible and even inconceivable at the
phonological level.
When Le´vi-Strauss introduced the canonical formula of myth
(1958g [1955]: 252–3 [228]), he did not relate it to the linguistic
model. On the contrary, from the ﬁrst volume of the Mythologiques
cycle, he made an astonishing attempt, fully articulated in the last
volume, to come out into the musical model. He called upon
music as a model of both exposure and interpretation, as a more
appropriate means of stating what the linguistic and semiological
conception of myth did not allow him to formulate explicitly. On
the one hand, Le´vi-Strauss asked that myths be read vertically
according to their various codes like a musical score, but more par-
ticularly he explains why myths, like music, cannot be transposed
into something else. If a myth is made explicit in a variant, like a
musical theme in a development, ‘‘the myths are only translatable
into each other in the same way as a melody is only translatable
into another which retains a relationship of homology with the
former’’ (1971: 577 [646]). Like myth, indeed, ‘‘the musical work,
which is a myth coded in sounds instead of words, offers an inter-
pretative grid, a matrix of relationships’’ (1971: 589 [659]), whose
speculative effectiveness Le´vi-Strauss showed in the case of Maurice
Ravel’s Bolero. No more than mythic thought, ‘‘It is inconceivable
that there should be any musical work that does not start from a
problem and tend towards its resolution’’ (1971: 590 [660]). The
general formula of myth, more precisely, echoes the art of the
fugue. It corresponds to the famous Spiegelbild, or ‘‘mirror play’’,
that fascinated European composers until Johann Sebastian Bach.
While shifting the meaning of myth or that of music from the sig-
niﬁed they contain to the signifying framework that orders them,
Le´vi-Strauss makes it possible to determine a ‘‘real focus’’ for
them. Music and myths cannot be reduced to a system of signiﬁ-
cances; they must be received in their own order, that of the opera-
tions induced by their own forms. The mirror play takes the place of
the ultimate signiﬁed of both music and myth.
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Any myth confronts a problem, and it deals with it by showing that it is analogous
to other problems, or else it deals with several problems simultaneously and shows
that they are analogous to one another. This mirror play, this set of images and
reﬂections which mirror each other, never mirror a real object. (Le´vi-Strauss,
1985: 227 [171])
This is why the analyst must conﬁne him- or herself to an exposure
which will reveal the mythical devices in the manner of an orchestra
conductor reading the score and leading its execution. It is thus not
a question of making available some meaning but of carrying out
an operation. In the same way, the reader is invited to let him- or
herself be ‘‘carried toward that music which is to be found in
myth’’ (Le´vi-Strauss, 1964: 40 [32]).
An expansive scientiﬁc approach
Le´vi-Strauss’s methodological closure may consist in a relatively
limited range of responses and default positions, in a kind of cross-
categorical application of different models of analysis and replica-
tion of methodologies, which are part of his constant appeal to
unify the different parts of his system and ensure its overall theore-
tical coherence (Johnson, 2003: 186–7). Yet in a way Le´vi-Strauss’s
work is also, as Geertz (1988: 32) put it, organized neither linearly in
a progress of views, nor quantumly in a series of discontinuous
reformulations of a ﬁxed and single view, but centrifugally, as a
virtual analogue of his own kaleidoscopic image of ‘‘concrete
thought’’.
In this sense, its overall meaning is well constructed in a syntactic
conjunction of discrete elements by projecting the analogue axis
of paradigmatic substitutions played out vertically along what
Jakobson (1981 [1960]) called the plane of similarity, or ‘‘meta-
phor’’, onto the digital axis of syntactic combination played out
horizontally along what he called the plane of contiguity, or
‘‘metonymy’’. This makes Le´vi-Strauss’s whole oeuvre look like a
metonymically adjoined poetic text. This is a model of analysis
where any aspect analysed stands side by side with the others,
where the meaning of the whole lies, in good structuralist style, in
the conjunction rather than in the parts conjoined, as if the syntax
of syntax, the enclosing form, were abstract enough to represent
or govern the whole.
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So it is that, while both the linguistic and musical models may go
some way to explaining the combinatorial and differential nature of
myth, Le´vi-Strauss’s analytical approach to myth needs to be read in
the context of the ambient science and technology of the period, as
exempliﬁed in mathematics, information science, cybernetics, game
theory and catastrophe theory, even though, to a great extent, the
informational paradigm, which Le´vi-Strauss claimed held much
promise for the social sciences, especially in the case of his own
speculations on the possibilities of formalization in anthropology,
is in fact mediated through linguistics, as he showed in his early
article, ‘‘Language and the Analysis of Social Laws’’ (1958d [1951]).
As Le´vi-Strauss moved into his second area of specialization, the
structural analysis of myth, information theory was at least of equal
importance to linguistics in terms of how he conceptualized his
object of study. His ‘‘linguistics of culture’’, as Leach (2000) termed
it, strongly reﬂected the techniques and logical presuppositions of
information theory and linear programming. Thus Le´vi-Strauss
came to be considered as part of that important intellectual move-
ment known as the cognitive revolution, to the extent that structural
analysis showed that myths and behaviour patterns store and trans-
mit vital information just as electronic circuits do in the computer.
An important aspect of Le´vi-Strauss’s procedure for analysing
myth is not to consider a single, supposedly more ‘‘authentic’’
version of a given myth but instead to take the myth as a virtual con-
struct, as the ensemble of its variants (1958g [1955]: 240–2 [217–18]).
This methodological approach owes much more to information
theory than it ought to linguistics, as Johnson showed in several
chapters of his book on Le´vi-Strauss’s ‘‘formative years’’ (2003).
The informational model provides a number of concepts which are
equally essential to Le´vi-Strauss’s analysis of myth, such as message,
coding, noise, redundancy, statistical distribution and, more impor-
tantly, entropy. The second law of thermodynamics states that
entropy, that is, the degree of disorder or disorganization of a
closed system, increases with time. Stated in informational terms,
this means that the message of a structure can lose order in the pro-
cess of transmission but can never gain it. If myth is a ‘‘language’’, it
is also more generally and more essentially encoded information,
and the process or principle of repetition in mythic narratives may
be compared with the basic principles of information theory.
The myth is a ‘‘message’’ whose content is not contained in a
single transmission, so to speak, but distributed across a range of
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separate transmissions in related myths. This is to treat myth as a
kind of ‘‘time series’’. The message of myth is a discrete or continu-
ous sequence of measurable events distributed in time, precisely
what statisticians call a time series, which connects with processes
whereby a reasonably large sample is representative of the sequence
as a whole. Inspired by cybernetics and communication theory,
Le´vi-Strauss illustrated this notion of the statistical reconstitution
of information with examples taken quite appropriately from the
domains of distributive optics (1958g [1955]: 242 [218]) or tele-
communications (1966: 106 [127]). So even though the time series
that is myth is fragmentary, it is possible to reconstitute its message
through a statistical treatment of a limited number of its variants.
Whatever the degree of distortion or noise to which the mythic
‘‘signal’’ is subjected, it is possible, in principle, to eliminate entropy
and reconstruct more or less accurately the original message. Le´vi-
Strauss expressed this possibility of recuperation in explicitly infor-
mational terms:
The second law of thermodynamics is not valid in the case of mythic operations: in
this ﬁeld, processes are reversible, and the information they convey is not lost; it is
simply converted into a latent state. It remains recoverable, and the role of struc-
tural analysis is to look beyond the apparent disorder of phenomena and to restore
the underlying order. (1971: 190 [216–17])
The analyst of myth is compared to an external observer attempt-
ing to reconstruct a given message or reality, in so far as he or she is
not the primary destination of the message but the interceptor of a
message intended for another. In fact, in its original context, the
coded information of myth could be seen to have a cybernetic func-
tion, to the extent that it is a ‘‘looped’’ message from a given society
to itself, a message distributed over time and space, with no locatable
centre of enunciation, a kind of meta-discourse whose function,
according to Le´vi-Strauss, is the regulation and resolution of contra-
dictions (1958e [1953]: 254 [229]).
In addition, the origins of Le´vi-Strauss’s notion of society as
communication and his initial optimism regarding the possible for-
malization of social behaviour from this perspective seem directly
reminiscent of the instrumental approach to knowledge, consistent
with the cybernetic problem of the design of machines as the con-
crete embodiment of logical processes. In fact, it seems that the
very notion of human mind, as Le´vi-Strauss understands and uses
it, originated in Wiener’s (1948) reﬂections on the limitations of
logic and on the possible applications of cybernetics, which are
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reducible in the ﬁnal instance to the workings of the human mind.
In particular, Le´vi-Strauss’s analysis of myth is operational to the
extent that myth is seen as a working model of speciﬁc processes
of human thinking. His presentation of theMythologiques sequence
is a kind of extended experiment, whose ‘‘laboratory’’ is the geo-
graphical zone covered by the two Americas, the ultimate goal of
the experiment being to uncover the inner logic of the human mind.
In the course of the argument, Le´vi-Strauss seeks to demonstrate
that successive variants of a myth cannot be discarded as irrelevant;
the sum of related narratives is a living aggregate, a code of cultural
reinterpretation in which single elements are regrouped and not lost.
The analogy is that of mathematical topology studying relations that
remain constant even when conﬁgurations change. Any complex
entity, from social or kinship relations to culture and civilization,
art, technology, totemic systems, myth and scientiﬁc knowledge, is
treated as an ensemble of traits or elements subject to speciﬁc
rules of combination, which are reduced to a series of oppositional
relations, following a model of analysis taken from both linguistics
and information theory.
Whereas Le´vi-Strauss’s description of the genesis of a system
shows the passage from the discontinuous to the continuous, using
notions from physics and chemistry such as ‘‘precipitation’’, ‘‘crys-
tallization’’ or ‘‘coalescence’’ of previously disparate elements, his
resolution of conﬂicting or hierarchical relationships into relations
of complementarity or reciprocity is linked to the more general
notions of mediation, regulation and homeostasis, or negative feed-
back, taken from Durkheim’s theory of social cohesion, Mauss’s
theory of reciprocity, and cybernetics. The relationship between
discrete complex systems, whether these are social, cultural or
mythic systems, is further seen as a relation of transformation,
according to a model of conceptualization grounded in new mathe-
matics, biology and catastrophe theory.
Le´vi-Strauss’s mathematical perspective is also common to
Piaget, Chomsky and other thinkers who adopt the mathematical
notion of ‘‘group’’; but the originality of Le´vi-Strauss’s contribution
must be seen in the analytical insight and methodological leverage he
derives from these notions, for instance, in the description of the
historical development of a complex system, the notion of whether
conscious or unconscious choice from a repertory of virtual paths
of development is conceived parallel to the notion of chance or
play in the development of stochastic systems randomly determined.
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The fundamental point remains the emancipation of a structural
approach from the linguistic model, that is, the passage from a semi-
ology centred on the sign to what we may call a ‘‘general agonistics’’,
a term Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard would use to describe the language
games of the Postmodern Condition (1979: 23), but understood
here as a game theory of social systems and as a praxis of competi-
tive and strategic practices. The notion of game, the full signiﬁcance
of which went unperceived by critics, is aimed at the intelligibility
of praxis, thus enabling anthropology to attain a new form of ration-
ality. Just as it proved to be necessary to go beyond the semiotic level
in resolving the question of the anteriority or posteriority of matri-
monial language with respect to articulated language in the fact of
the passage from nature to culture, it was no less pressing to go
beyond the conscious level in order to resolve the epistemological
dilemma of dualism between subject and object. It is precisely the
theoretical issue of game and rules that outlines an overcoming of
this much-debated opposition.
Le´vi-Strauss constructs his scientiﬁc work through the distinc-
tion of the contingent and the necessary, which is also that of
event and structure. In this construction, the parataxis forcefully
underlines the discontinuity and rupture that symbolically express
the catastrophe. Much more, the development of some new and
invigorated trends of structural paradigm, subsumed in Le´vi-
Strauss’s concept of canonical expression, which lends itself as the
regulating principle of the structural and morphodynamic epistemo-
logical project (Scubla, 1998; Maranda, 2001), already shows the
opportunity for a renewed ethnography which makes a better use
of hypothetical and deductive reasoning, reﬂexivity and the trans-
latability of mutually convertible codes relating to empirical cross-
cultural and borderland realities. The theoretical project inspired
by the canonical formula can show that structural anthropology is
also intimately concerned with processes of social conﬂict, change,
praxis and agency, which seems to be a neglected but essential
aspect of Le´vi-Strauss’s theory.
The scope of anthropology
With Greek and Roman thinkers as background, the philosophers
of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment carved out positions
that continue to serve as points of orientation today. Descartes
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took a strong mentalistic position, arguing that the mind operates
according to its own principles and comes stocked with innate
ideas. Echoes of this perspective are to be found in the writings of
Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor, self-identiﬁed nativists. The
British empiricists, led by Locke, took an opposing perspective,
according to which the mind is initially a blank slate, experience
etches ideas onto the slate, and these ideas become associated with
one another. Behaviourists in the 20th century, like the Russian
physiologist Ivan Pavlov and the American psychologists, or ‘‘learn-
ing theorists’’, from B. F. Skinner to Jerome Bruner and Howard
Gardner, subscribed to this empiricist point of view.
In the 18th century, a new perspective took hold. Immanuel Kant
described the basic epistemological categories, such as time, space,
number and causality, which human beings necessarily impose on
their sensations and perceptions. Individuals do learn from experi-
ence, but that experience is necessarily apprehended in temporal,
spatial and causal ways. The Kantian problematic had a great
effect on the research programme of the 20th-century developmental
psychologist Jean Piaget, who sought to describe the development of
these categories of experience in infants and young children. Already
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Piaget’s countryman and Kant’s contem-
porary, discerned genius in the mind of the child and believed that
knowledge should be allowed to unfold within, rather than be
imposed didactically upon, the child.
Kant had already accorded great importance, in the work of
Rousseau, to what announced the possibility of a reconciliation of
nature and culture by means of ‘‘practical reason’’ as an alternative
source in a world which needs rules of natural law but cannot derive
that law from nature (Cassirer, 1954). In so doing, Rousseau must
have articulated the core concern of 20th-century anthropology,
and in Le´vi-Strauss’s (1973b [1962]) vision the second Discourse is
without a doubt the ﬁrst anthropological treatise in French litera-
ture. Indeed, in almost modern terms, Rousseau posed the central
problem of anthropology, namely, the passage from nature to
culture: ‘‘The object of this Discourse is exactly to pinpoint that
moment in the progress of things when, with right succeeding
violence, nature was subjected to the law’’ (Rousseau, 1969 [1755]:
62 [77]).
To be sure, an enormous inﬂuence was also exerted by the rise of
evolutionary thinking, emanating chieﬂy from the insights of Charles
Darwin, who stressed the continuities between human beings and
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other animals, and the importance of mental capacities that allowed
individual organisms to survive until reproduction. As soon as the
implications of Darwin’s writings became clear, his way of think-
ing came to dominate both the theories and the empirical work of
scientists interested in learning and culture. The ﬁrst generation of
modern scholars did not shrink from attending to the more complex
forms of reasoning in human beings and other primates. But begin-
ning in the early 20th century, the territory was largely ceded to
those researchers who stressed continuity across the animal king-
dom, avoided issues of language, consciousness and higher-order
ratiocination, and strove to explain any intellectual achievement in
the most parsimonious and reductionist fashion.
Indeed, this approach, fashioned in the writings of evolutionary
psychologists and genetic behaviourists, might still hold sway
today had it not been for the development of high-speed computers
and the complex programs that have permitted these electronic
entities to compute and solve various kinds of human-scale problems.
Once it became clear that computers could mimic human thought
processes and, in the view of many, bootstrap themselves over
time to a higher level of performance, scientists could no longer
withhold such intellectual competences from human beings. Thus
was born the cognitive revolution, an important intellectual move-
ment among whose forefathers were the computer scientists Herbert
Simon and Marvin Minsky, the psychologists George Miller and
Jerome Bruner, the linguist Noam Chomsky and the anthropologist
Claude Le´vi-Strauss. The cognitive revolution is now a contempor-
ary interdisciplinary effort to provide scientiﬁc answers to long-
standing epistemological questions.
In anthropology, the main thrust of Le´vi-Straussian epistemology
is to assert that the process of thinking takes place in categories and
demands making distinctions, and that not the content but the very
fact of categories and distinctions distorts the ‘‘true’’ nature of the
object of thought. If, as Le´vi-Strauss believed to be the case, the
mediating ‘‘unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing
forms upon content’’ (1958b [1949]: 28 [21]), Ricoeur’s characteriza-
tion of Le´vi-Straussian structural anthropology as a ‘‘Kantianism
without a transcendental subject’’ (Ricoeur, 1969: 55) is an apt
phrase which Le´vi-Strauss himself readily applauds (Le´vi-Strauss,
1964: 19 [11]). He asserts, like Kant, that the world is seen through
prestructuring spectacles. Nothing is seen as it is, but only as it is
conceptually constructed in relation to other objects against which
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it is contrasted, and thought depends upon language and thus upon
the particular categories that a particular culture singles out.
These forms that the Le´vi-Straussian mind applies necessarily to
things are as constraining and universal as the categories of Kantian
understanding, they are a-historical and a-cultural, since they ‘‘are
fundamentally the same for all minds, ancient and modern, primitive
and civilized, as the study of the symbolic function expressed in
language so strikingly indicates’’ (Le´vi-Strauss, 1958b [1949]: 28
[21]). In one sense they are as empty as the a priori forms of sensi-
bility, as Le´vi-Strauss showed for instance in relation to the ‘‘effec-
tiveness of symbols’’:
The unconscious is always empty, or more accurately it is as alien to mental images
as is the stomach to the foods which pass through it. As the organ of a speciﬁc
function, the unconscious merely imposes structural laws upon inarticulated
elements which originate elsewhere, impulses, emotions, representations and
memories. (Le´vi-Strauss, 1958c [1949]: 224 [203])
This symbolic function is explicitly identiﬁed with the uncon-
scious, which is its organ, an unconscious not psychological, but
rather categorial, whose role consists in imposing structural laws
upon a given matter. While formless and inarticulate, the elements
that reach the human mind take meaning, acquire signiﬁcance and
become intelligible thanks to the operation by which the mind struc-
tures them. Owing to the assumption that these forms of founding
signiﬁcances are universal and immutable, Le´vi-Strauss draws a
methodological principle according to which any search for meaning
of whatever human institution must be able to reveal them. Present
in all the operations that the human mind controls, immutable and
universal laws appear at all levels of the symbolic realm, as much in
kinship systems as in myths. Indeed, behind their appearance of
arbitrary and unbridled inventiveness, they conceal laws that are
quite as constraining as any other human production. For Le´vi-
Strauss, faithful to Tylor, ‘‘if the human mind appears determined
even in the realm of mythology, a fortiori it must also be determined
in all its spheres of activity’’ (Le´vi-Strauss, 1964: 18 [10]).
This is a transposition of Kantian philosophy to anthropology,
although along different lines leading to different conclusions.
Le´vi-Strauss as an anthropologist, unlike Kant as a philosopher,
does not feel obliged to take as a fundamental subject of reﬂection
the conditions in which his own thought operates or the science
peculiar to his society and the period in which he lives in order to
extend these local ﬁndings to a form of understanding whose
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universality can never be more than hypothetical and potential.
Instead of assuming a universal form of understanding, the anthro-
pologist prefers to study empirically collective forms of understand-
ing, whose properties have been solidiﬁed, as it were, and are
revealed to him in countless concrete systems of cultural representa-
tions. Moved to the extreme and objective limits of the ethnographic
records by the search for what can be shared between an humanity
that appears most distant to us and the way our own mind works,
the anthropologist tries to uncover a pattern of universal and funda-
mental constraints common to all minds everywhere. Thus, for Le´vi-
Strauss, since his ambition is to
discover the conditions in which systems of truth becomemutually convertible and
therefore simultaneously acceptable to several different subjects, the pattern of
those conditions takes on the character of an autonomous object with a reality
of its own, independent of any subject. (1964: 19 [11])
The question at the heart of Le´vi-Strauss’s anthropology is why
everywhere in the world people tell selected myths, venerate particu-
lar totems, and prescribe or prohibit speciﬁed categories of
marriageable partners and not others. If they act everywhere in
such a way, they must have an intellectual device which leads
them to act in that way.
One fundamental idea of great importance in Le´vi-Strauss’s work
is the notion that social behaviour is always conducted by reference
to a conceptual scheme, a model in the actor’s mind of how things
are or how they ought to be. Yielding to Marxism and accepting
the ‘‘incontestable primacy of the infrastructures’’ and the ‘‘praxis
of social groups’’, he aimed to ‘‘reduce’’ anthropology to a theory
of superstructures, whose subject matter is not change in ideology
but the mediating mental schemas between infrastructural praxis
(human activity) and superstructural practices (cultural institu-
tions), by elaborating a conceptual system which is a synthesizing
operator between ideas and facts (Le´vi-Strauss, 1962b: 173–4).
Durkheim already advocated this type of sociological explana-
tion, since social phenomena are ‘‘objectivated systems of ideas’’.
But at the same time he also advocated the ‘‘methodical experiment’’
to study social facts as if they were ‘‘things’’ (Durkheim, 1988
[1895]). The theoretical difﬁculties that Durkheim encountered
when he relied upon collective emotional states as a ﬁnal explana-
tory fact are merely the expression of an inappropriate formulation
of the problem. The symbolic achievements that Durkheim sought
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to explain sociologically simply cannot be traced back to social facts
because they give rise to the social in the ﬁrst place.
Le´vi-Strauss reversed Durkheim’s position by positing the origin
of the symbolic aspect of cultural phenomena in the dialectical
workings of the human mind and not in the way society is organized.
Le´vi-Strauss argues that the symbolic system is, by deﬁnition, the set
of laws that makes social life possible and necessary, that governs
the very nature of humans and their cultural productions and, in
short, the condition of meaning. It must therefore be taken for
granted as a Kantian a priori form. Convinced that the forms of
symbolic thought are a given that cannot be further explained socio-
logically, he regarded the intersubjectively binding character of
shared symbols through which a social order is constituted as
embedded in pre-social facts, deﬁned programmatically as the
‘‘unconscious activity of the human mind’’, to which not sociology
but rather a ‘‘psychological anthropology’’ might provide theoreti-
cal access.
Paving the way for a cognitive turn in anthropology, Le´vi-Strauss
resolved the Durkheimian antinomy between dialectical and experi-
mental methods by arguing that, through the mediation of concep-
tual schemas, facts and ideas are turned into signs and accomplished
as structures, that is, ‘‘things both empirical and intelligible’’ (1962b:
173 [130]). Durkheim’s ‘‘objectivated systems of ideas’’ are uncon-
scious, or underlain by unconscious psychical structures that make
them possible, which explains how social phenomena may present
the character of meaningful wholes and structured systems. It fol-
lows for Le´vi-Strauss that, since humans communicate by means
of symbols and signs, and since social phenomena are made possible
by the fundamental mediation of conceptual schemas, all cultural
domains are ‘‘pregnant with meaning’’, whose only suitable expla-
nation must be dialectical as opposed to mechanical. Thus social
phenomena present the character of ‘‘things’’ but at the same time
can be treated as ideas to be rethought in their logical order.
For Le´vi-Strauss, in the societies he studied there seems to be no
strict correspondence between the details of material life and the
diversity of social practices. Neither economic nor environmental
factors can account for the diversity of individual kinship systems
or the particulars of cultural activity. Even if they could, the univers-
ality of structural patterns would still need explanation. Rejecting a
strict correlation between the details of material life and ideas, he
remarked in turn that the quality of intellectual selection is in that
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which is ‘‘good to think’’ (1962a: 132 [89]). Symbolic systems formed
by cultures are ideational, of the same kind as language, and exist
prior to individuals. There would thus be a set of rules whose uncon-
scious logical order must be used by people to construe their world.
In other words, mental categories and the capacities of human mind
are thought to be incarnated mental activities, actualized in the
cultural symbolic systems of the social world in the most different
societies.
If, as we believe to be the case, the unconscious activity of the mind consists in
imposing forms upon content and if these forms are fundamentally the same for
all minds, ancient and modern, primitive and civilized, it is necessary and sufﬁcient
to grasp the unconscious structure underlying each institution and each custom, in
order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other
customs. (1958b [1949]: 28 [21])
Appropriately, despite the interest in mental structures, Le´vi-
Strauss never turned away from empirical concerns but instead
advocated that the anthropologist must aim at discovering the
mechanisms of that unconscious objectivated thought on an ethno-
graphic basis (1962b: 63 [46], 1964: 10–11 [3], 1971: 562 [628–9]).
Structural analysis ‘‘reveals, behind phenomena, a unity and a
coherence that could not be brought out by a simple description
of the facts, ‘laid out ﬂat’, so to speak, and presented in random
order to the enquiring mind. By changing the level of observation
and looking beyond the empirical facts to the relations between
them, it reveals and conﬁrms that these relations are simpler and
more intelligible than the things they interconnect, and whose
ultimate nature may remain unfathomable, without this provisional
or deﬁnitive opacity being, as hitherto, an obstacle to their inter-
pretation’’ (Le´vi-Strauss 1971: 614 [687]).
That perception apprehends categories of the sensitive (the raw
and the cooked, the fresh and the rotted, the boiled and the roast),
or psychical and intellectual realities; it offers to the intelligence
that can decipher them networks which articulate reality in struc-
tures that a naive empiricism would not be able to reveal. The
same logic, be it mytho-logical, anthropo-logical or socio-logical,
governs all the operations of the human mind. Thus is conﬁrmed
the bold assumption formulated since 1955. The conceptualization,
violently directed against empiricist temptations, knows indeed a
single mode, only its objects differ: ‘‘Resemblances no longer
belong to the domain of pure observation. Instead of being appre-
hended as empirical data, they are comprehended as rational entities.
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They cease to be merely observable, and become demonstrable’’
(Le´vi-Strauss, 1971: 32–3 [38]).
Le´vi-Strauss recognized that the actual behaviour of real indi-
viduals may be full of irregularity and improvisation. But in his
view these practices are nevertheless an expression of the actors’
orderly ideal scheme, just as the ideal scheme is itself a programme
for action produced by the praxis of the whole society. We may use-
fully compare the patterning of the relations which links together
sets of human behaviours, but we shall not learn anything if we
simply compare single cultural items as isolates. Any particular
empirical case is only one alternative from a whole set of possi-
bilities, which is a total system, with a theme and variations. The
study of empirical phenomena is thus an essential part of the
discovery process but it is only a means to an end.
This emphasis on the empirical is actually less paradoxical than
it might seem, for it forms the connecting thread between the
materialist thrust of Le´vi-Strauss’s early work on kinship and his
later intellectual development. Anthropology is only apparently
the study of customs, beliefs or institutions. Fundamentally, anthro-
pological investigation is the study of thought. For Le´vi-Strauss,
anthropology must investigate the structures underlying the diver-
sity of human cultures, to the extent that such structures refer to
the properties of the human mind and to the symbolic functions
which characterize it. Within this project, the aim of structural
anthropology is to arrive at structures so general as to be common
to all societies, absolute to the extent they are universal categories
of the human mind, that is, structural invariants organized in
systems of signiﬁcances.
However, the investigation into the unconscious sphere of social
activity and the structural programme was not carried out at the
expense of a more materially based inquiry. Le´vi-Strauss’s material-
ist thrust was only displaced and refocused on ‘‘fundamental struc-
tures of the human mind’’, which spared him the accusations of both
idealism and crude materialism. The empirical and analytical experi-
ence of structural procedures in anthropology, in any area that can
be taken over by philosophical and metaphysical speculations,
obtained the advantage of contributing to a ‘‘regressive erosion’’
of all taught philosopy (Le´vi-Strauss, 1971: 570 [638]), in such a
way as to send the philosophers back to what Nietzsche already
called their ‘‘phantasmagorias’’. Le´vi-Strauss could then maintain
his empirical interests and out of hand reject criticisms conducted
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along these lines, which also explains why he kept so distant from
poststructuralist thought even though he was one of its primary
instigators (Doja, forthcoming, 2006).
The properties of what Le´vi-Strauss qualiﬁed as the ‘‘savage
mind’’ are at the same time structured and structuring. The primacy
of unconscious forms comes from the fact that they express a mode
of disclosing and of producing a world. Rejecting interpretations in
terms of history, cultural singularity and function, Le´vi-Strauss
opened the ﬁeld to another possible, that of meaning. Since the ques-
tion of meaning is put in the diversity of cultures, the irreducible
position of the identity of human mind is in effect established. If
there are laws of general importance which make sense behind the
apparent cultural diversity, there must exist then a universal mental
structure.
The heroic horizon: toward a future anthropology
No doubt, for Le´vi-Strauss, the unconscious is conceived as having
objective existence, being related to the biological nature of humans,
to the very structure of mind and its speciﬁcally structural modal-
ities. In contrast to the psychoanalytic unconscious, the structural
unconscious reveals a formal framework or cognitive architecture
that Le´vi-Strauss both anticipated and called for. If we assert the
pre-eminence of the categorial character of the unconscious, the
symbolic will set out the widest possible differential for humans in
a way that integrates all other dimensions. However, the origin of
this differential is to be found in the very ‘‘architecture’’ of the
brain as an integral part of the space–time reality.
Structural assumptions have thus had an unquestionable impact,
even if they did not seem either always well grounded or always
fertile. Structural anthropology constitutes an original set of theore-
tical reﬂections on cultural and social aspects of human life, and
structural methodology rests on assumptions that are neither tauto-
logical nor trivial, but which relate to the very nature of human facts.
By its monumental character, Le´vi-Strauss’s work evokes that
of the founders of anthropology (Sperber, 1982: 125), from
L.H. Morgan to Sir James Frazer, whereas, by the way in which
he granted equal space to the mental and the material, he anticipated
a strong programmatic claim for an expansive scientiﬁc approach
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and a theoretical anthropology to come. Le´vi-Strauss’s anthro-
pology is a model-theoretic discipline, an axiomatic and deductive
science. Its object remains the psyche, which it was already for
E.B. Tylor. Its quest, however, culminates not in the hypothetical
reconstruction of the evolutionary path toward enlightened moder-
nity but instead in the formal exegesis of the universal ‘‘grammar’’,
the structural and structuring properties of the mind itself. Le´vi-
Strauss proposed to develop an analysis of the operations of the
human mind which does not deal with the psychological structures
of individuals or even the whole structures of a society but, going
farther, with the organizational schema of any society.
At Le´vi-Strauss’s instigation, the anthropological approach
would comprise three stages, under the double relationship of
methodology and subject of analysis, going from case studies to
the description of general laws. Discreetly evocative of the uni-
versalist project which animated philosophical anthropologies,
structural anthropology implies a hierarchy of modes and objects
of knowledge wherein ethnography and ethnology are the other
terms, not in a decreasing order of dignity, but according to their
internal articulation within the various stages of scientiﬁc approach.
With this passage from the particular to the general, a process of
synthesis formerly reserved for sociology, Le´vi-Strauss established
the legitimacy of a theoretical anthropology as much distinct from
and complementary to ethnography as theoretical physics is distinct
from and complementary to experimental physics. In addition, in his
attempt to overcome the conﬂict between individualism and holism,
he showed that sociology, in its study of aggregates of individuals
using ‘‘statistical models’’, and anthropology, in its study of the
coherence of social structures using ‘‘mechanical models’’ (1958f
[1953]: 311–13 [283–5]), entertain the same type of relationship
with each other as thermodynamics with quantum mechanics in
modern physics, as they respectively study the collective behaviour
and the internal structure of atoms and molecules.
Le´vi-Strauss’s early works do not merely construct the ﬁrst step
of a structural study of kinship. What is interesting about The
Elementary Structures of Kinship (1967 [1949]) is that this contribu-
tion to an extremely specialized branch of anthropology is accompa-
nied by a more general contribution to social theory. Le´vi-Strauss
is concerned not simply to bring some kind of order to the mass of
data accumulated on kinship relations, which has been the occasion
of much debate in the specialized domain of kinship studies, but also
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to determine the theoretical foundations of his scientiﬁc contri-
bution to general anthropology. The elementary types of alliance
offered a ﬁrst sample of the organizing principles of culture and
their capacity to generate a ﬁnite number of coherent forms. On
that basis, it seemed that anthropology had a vocation to draw up
a systematic inventory of all structurally stable social forms
(Scubla, 1998). The principles of structural anthropology could
appear then formally similar to the principles of quantum physics
that provide the key to atomic structures. Much more, Le´vi-Strauss
in social science, like Einstein in natural science, by proving the
rigorous patterning of, respectively, the transformational structure
of myths and the relativity of the universe, has conferred on these
the same status of absolute objects.
‘‘If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants’’,
declared Isaac Newton in 1676, referring to his own work on optics.
Unfortunately and to the collective detriment of social sciences
and anthropology, but contrary to the natural sciences to which
Stephen Hawking (2002) has recently paid a vibrant homage, we
all too often tend to neglect the shoulders of our giants, not so
much out of disloyalty as out of the sad vanity of an increasingly
individualistic world in which we live. Perhaps Le´vi-Strauss is not
yet the Einstein he believed anthropology was waiting for (1958h
[1956]: 180 [162]) nor the Mendeleyev cosmologist of social sciences
he strove to be (1955: 203 [178]). Nevertheless, by charting a periodic
table of disciplines in which anthropology ﬁnds its assigned place
(1973c [1964]: 350–1 [298–9]), by constructing in the spirit of the
new physics his celebrated ‘‘atom of kinship’’ (1958a [1945]: 58 [48])
and by conferring on mythic schemas the status of ‘‘absolute
objects’’ (1964: 21 [13], 1971: 33 [38]), that is, a structural form
similar to molecular stability, which can only become intelligible
by the use of a ‘‘canonical formula’’ (1958g [1955]: 252–3 [228]),
he inspired, in those his writings awakened to anthropological voca-
tion, the feeling of taking part in a new intellectual adventure that
was brilliant and captivating.
More than anything else, Le´vi-Strauss cleared an imaginative
space for generations of anthropologists to come, and his academic
importance is now unquestioned. Anthropology’s reputation owes
much to him and his reputation among anthropologists remains
exalted. Although his work is not easily accessible to the uninitiated,
nor have all been convinced by his propositions, far from it, and
despite all the criticism to which his work is subjected, the prestige
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and the brilliance of the questions he raised in central areas like
kinship, classiﬁcation and mythology have radically transformed
the way anthropologists pose questions and deﬁne their subject
matter. His generalizations reached such grandiose scales that they
are likely to provide an easy target for hostile critics, and there
can be some weak patches in Le´vi-Strauss’s argument. It is easy to
show that he is sometimes wrong on points of detail, but this does
not detract from the massive validity of his major generalizations.
Whatever the future impact of his work and even if time should
reveal problems and limitations of structural analysis, the funda-
mental method of Le´vi-Strauss’s theory thus construed, even
though far less inﬂuential than it was in the 1960s, is by no means
bereft; it is an intellectual achievement that has not been surpassed
and an innovation from which there can be no retreat.
Le´vi-Strauss’s anthropology is ﬁrst a method of original knowl-
edge, developed in the course of treating problems particular to a
discipline but whose object is in principle so vast and whose fertility
so remarkable that it quickly exerted an inﬂuence far beyond the
original ﬁeld of research. In many ways, the programme he con-
structed for anthropology became the ‘‘normal science’’ for the dis-
cipline as a whole, to the extent that, by the originality of his
prescriptions as by the diversity of the phenomena he attempted to
elucidate, he is an indispensable point of reference, in respect of
which all generations of successive anthropologists, whatever their
individual specializations or orientations, are held to deﬁne their
approach, whether they subscribe to or dissociate themselves from
these. There are however only a few who have effectively implemen-
ted some of the methods already tested by Le´vi-Strauss himself.
Others, even if fewer, have succeeded in widening the ﬁeld of their
validity by reformulating on occasion their assumptions. But this
suggests in itself that the impact of structural anthropology is not
limited to the remarkable achievements which established its initial
legitimacy.
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